ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION

28
The ability to predict, detect, and make decisions about danger is essential for maximising one's chances of 29 survival. In humans, threatening visual stimuli are detected more quickly and are more difficult to disengage from 30 than non-threatening stimuli (Smith and Lane, 2016) . Danger, however, is not always clearly visible. We must 31 also be able to detect potential threats in visually ambiguous situations, such as when observing from a distance, 32 50 established explicitly, for instance by a cue preceding the stimulus (Pinto et al., 2015 , Chang et al., 2015 , Meijs et 51 al., 2018 , Costello et al., 2009 , or implicitly, such as by the number of stimulus presentations in the past (Barbosa 52 et al., 2017 , Aru et al., 2016 , Gordon et al., 2017 . 53
Behavioural models of perceptual decision making, like drift-diffusion modelling (DDM; Ratcliff and McKoon, 54 2008) , have shown that prior expectations may bias the starting point of evidence accumulation such that we are 55 predisposed towards one conclusion over another before the decision process has even begun (Barbosa et al., 2017 , 56 Mulder et al., 2012 , Wiech et al., 2014 , Dunovan et al., 2014 , White et al., 2018 , White et al., 2016 . Prior 57 expectations have also been shown to increase the drift rate of evidence accumulation (Dunovan et al., 2014 , White 58 et al., 2016 and may lower the threshold for awareness (De Loof et al., 2016) . Other components of the decision 59 making process, such as sensory processing and/or motor response execution (known collectively as non-decision 60 time; Ratcliff and McKoon, 2008) have also been shown to speed up with prior expectations (Jepma et al., 2012) 61 or when stimuli are self-relevant (Macrae et al., 2017) . 62 accumulation (Tipples, 2015) even when unconsciously-presented (Lufityanto et al., 2016) , as well as bias the 67 starting point towards threat (Zaman et al., 2017) . There has, however, been very little investigation into how the 68 prioritisation of fearful stimuli for conscious access might be influenced by prior expectations. 69
We propose three testable hypotheses for how prior expectations might influence conscious access to suppressed 70 threatening and neutral stimuli. The first is the Emotional Exaggeration Hypothesis, which proposes that. the 71 effect of expectation on conscious perception is exaggerated for emotional stimuli. Previous studies have found 72 that surprise-related evoked potentials are larger and earlier for emotional than neutral stimuli (Vogel et al., 2015 , 73 Kovarski et al., 2017 , Chen et al., 2017 . If the effect of expectation is even larger for emotional stimuli, as this 74 suggests, then we might expect that earlier conscious perception of expected than unexpected stimuli (after an 75 initial period of unawareness) is even more extreme for emotional stimuli. Indeed, previous inattentional blindness 76 research suggests that both emotional and neutral stimuli are missed equally as often when they are unexpected 77 but emotional stimuli are detected more frequently than neutral stimuli when expected (Beanland et al., 2017 , 78 Wiemer et al., 2013 . 79
As an alternative to the Exaggeration Hypothesis (where the effect of threat on expectation is synergistic), we 80 might consider a Survival Hypothesis, such that threat negates or reverses the effect of expectation on conscious 81
perception. This captures the notion that, even in situations where a threat is unexpected, it is still vital (or, 82 arguably, even more vital) that we can rapidly respond (Den Ouden et al., 2012) . Studies on attentional capture 83 and inattentional blindness have found that, while neutral stimuli evoke slower responses when they are 84 unexpected, threatening stimuli elicit the fastest responses in visual search tasks regardless of prior expectations 85 (Aue et al., 2016 , Aue et al., 2013 . Other research, however, has shown that novelty detection and attentional 86 biases towards threat are enhanced in contexts where threats are unpredictable (Garcia-Garcia et al., 2010 , Aue 87 and Okon-Singer, 2015 , Bar-Haim et al., 2007 , Notebaert et al., 2010 . Additionally, unexpected threats are more 88 frequently detected than unexpected neutral images (New and German, 2015) and evoke stronger physiological 89 responses (Wiemer et al., 2013) , even under high perceptual load (Gao and Jia, 2017) . It is thought that subcortical 90 'survival circuits' involving the amygdala facilitate rapid modulation of conscious perception, such as faster threat 91 detection in visual search and attentional blink paradigms (Tamietto and De Gelder, 2010, Mitchell and Greening, 92 2012) . Hence, such facilitation may circumvent or interact with the influence of top-down expectations, resulting 93 in earlier conscious access to emotional stimuli that is unmodulated or hastened by surprise (Hohwy, 2012) . 94
In contrast to the first two hypotheses that predict a synergistic (Emotional Exaggeration Hypothesis) or 95 antagonistic (Survival Hypothesis) interaction between threat and expectation, a third possibility is that threat and 96 expectation do not interact. Some inattentional blindness research has found no advantage of unexpected threats 97 versus non-threats in entering awareness (Calvillo and Hawkins, 2016, Beanland et al., 2017 Olszanowski et al., 2015) . The final selection consisted of 267 images of Caucasian adults (66 females and 71 129 males) displaying either a neutral or fearful facial expression. We cropped the hair, neck, and shoulders from all 130 face stimuli (see Fig. 1 ). We then centred the faces within a 365 x 365 pixel square with a grey background for 131 Experiment 1 and a black background for Experiment 2 (to maximise the visually-evoked EEG response to the 132 face, due to the greater contrast difference for greyscale stimuli fading in from black than grey). We equated 133 luminance and root-mean square contrast (of pixels in the entire image, including the face and grey background) 134 across all images using the SHINE toolbox (Willenbockel et al., 2010) We used Mondrian images to mask the stimuli (see Fig. 1 ). These images were made using code available online 139 (http://martin-hebart.de/webpages/code/stimuli.html; as used in Stein, Seymour, Hebart, & Sterzer, 2014 Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970) . We then determined the participants' ocular dominance using 146 the Miles Test (Miles, 1930) . Participants then sat approximately 1.1m (Experiment 1) or 0.55m (Experiment 2) 147 from a 22" LCD monitor (1980 × 1020 resolution) with a black screen divider placed in front (see Supplementary 148 were used instead of prism lenses as they were faster to set up. Both methods result in dichoptic presentation (see 151 Supplementary Fig. 1) . 152
In both experiments, participants completed a short calibration task (using placeholder stimuli the size of the mask) 153 and the apparatus was adjusted (i.e. angle of mirrors/prism lenses, computer monitor height, etc.) to ensure that 154 the stimuli presented to each eye were perceived to be in the same location in space (i.e. completely overlapping 155 in the centre of field of vision) and that only one stimulus could be perceived with each eye. Note that in 156 Experiment 1, an eye tracker was also used to ensure that participants did not close one eye during the experiment 157 (which would interrupt the interocular suppression). 158
Behavioural paradigm
159
Each trial began with the mask presented at 100% contrast to the participant's dominant eye and a face stimulus 160 presented at 0% to the other eye (see Fig. 1 ). In Experiment 1, the stimuli were set to fade over a period of 6 s, 161 with the mask fading out from 100% to 0% contrast and the face fading in from 0% to 100% contrast. Experiment 162 2 was the same, except the time period was reduced to 3 s (to reduce experiment length and increase the number 163 of trials) and the mask contrast was fixed at 100% (to avoid an onset effect in the EEG signal). In both experiments, 164 the face images were pseudo-randomly rotated 5° clockwise or counter-clockwise. Participants were instructed to 165 click the left or right mouse button as soon as they could perceive the orientation of the face. Participants were 166 told to maintain accuracy as close to 100% as possible while also making the responses as fast as possible. In 167 Experiment 1, trials ended upon response (if responses were over 6 s, the face remained at 100% and the mask at 168 0% until response), whereas in Experiment 2, trials always ended after 3 s regardless of response. Between trials, 169 a fixation cross was presented at the centre of each left and right image frame. The duration of the inter-trial 170 interval (ITI) jittered randomly between 0.5 and 1 s at a step of 0.1 s for Experiment 1, and between 0.25 to 0.50 171 s at a step of 0.05 s for Experiment 2. 172
There were eight blocks in Experiment 1 and fourteen blocks in Experiment 2. In both experiments, participants 173 were informed that some blocks would contain more of one emotional expression than others but that this was 174 irrelevant to their task (i.e. they were to respond to every face they saw, regardless of emotion). Half of the blocks 175 contained predominantly (83%) neutral faces while the other half of the blocks contained predominantly fearful 176 faces. The dominant emotional expression was indicated at the beginning of each block by a 5 s presentation of 177 the word "Neutral" or "Fearful". Neutral and fearful blocks were alternated, with the starting block emotion 178 counterbalanced across participants. There were 90 trials per block and each block began with at least two trials 179 for the predominant emotion. The presentations of rare and unexpected (17%) emotional faces were thereafter 180 spaced apart by 2 to 7 trials (following a Gaussian distribution). There were 720 total trials for Experiment 1 (300 181 expected and 60 unexpected trials per neutral/fearful expression) and 1,260 total trials for Experiment 2 (525 182 expected and 105 unexpected trials per neutral/fearful expression). 183 184 Figure 1 . Schematic for the basic paradigm across experiments. In Experiment 1 (A), the face linearly faded from 0% to 185 maximum contrast over 6 s, while the mask did the opposite in the non-dominant eye. Experiment 2 (B) was the same except 186 that the fade period was 3 s, the mask remained at maximum contrast, and the face background was black rather than grey. In 187 both experiments, participants perceived the mask at first, followed by a period of mixed percept of the mask and the face (as 188 shown in the 'Percept' column). For Experiment 1, the trial ended upon response, whereas for Experiment 2, the trial always 189 ended at 3 s regardless of response. The inter-trial interval (ITI) was jittered between 0.5s and 1s for Experiment 1, and 190 between 0.25 and 0.5s for Experiment 2 (the mask was also shown throughout the ITI for Experiment 2). Note that identifying 191 information (facial features hidden by red boxes) has been redacted from this preprint.
192
Behavioral titration procedure for EEG recording (Experiment 2) 193 In Experiment 2, participants completed a titration task while the EEG cap was set up. The purpose of the titration 194 task was to ensure that responses could be made on the majority of trials (e.g. participants more susceptible to 195 masking effects might take longer than the 3-second trial window to consciously perceive the face, thus making 196 less responses overall). The titration task consisted of four blocks: two neutral-dominant and two fearful-dominant 197 blocks in an alternate order, with the starting block counterbalanced across participants. Each block contained 90 198 trials, with 83% dominant emotion presentations and 17% rare emotion presentations. All aspects of the titration 199 trials (e.g., stimuli, timing) were the same as the trials in Experiment 2 (see Fig. 1 ). 200
The titration began with the mask at low contrast relative to the face (100% face, 0% mask). Using the Palamedes 201 toolbox (Prins and Kingdom, 2009) , contrast was adjusted per trial, such that if the response was faster than 2 s, 202 the next trial's face contrast would be decreased and mask contrast increased (hence, mask contrast always 203 equalled 1 minus the face contrast), and vice versa for responses slower than 2 seconds. Thus, the face and mask 204 contrasts were adjusted so that conscious breakthrough occurred approximately two thirds of the way into each 205 trial for each participant, accommodating for individual differences in sensitivity to interocular suppression. The 206 stepwise function used for these trial-by-trial adjustments began with 10% contrast adjustments, which were 207 reduced by 2% each time a reversal (i.e. a change in response type; fast to slow, or slow to fast) was made. After 208 4 reversals, contrast adjustments were fixed at 2%. These staircases were constructed independently for the first 209 two blocks of titration trials (one neutral, one fearful), resulting in one ending set of contrasts per emotion. This 210 value was used as the starting point for the second block of each dominant emotion, giving a fine-tuned contrast 211 set built across two blocks of 90 trials each per neutral and fearful block type. The neutral-dominant and fearful-212 dominant contrast sets were then averaged together, giving face contrast values ranging from 53.23% to 91.68% 213 (M = 76.75%, SD = 10.25%) across participants (mask contrast values were equal to 1 minus the face contrast). 214 Each participant's final titrated face contrast value was used for all face stimuli (neutral or fearful, in any block 215 type) presented in the main experiment, where faces faded in from 0% to the titrated value over 3 seconds. 216
Although the first two participants did not complete the titration task, their mean reaction times throughout the 217 experiment were 1.803 s and 2.288s, respectively, and so they were included in further behavioural and EEG 218 Centre for Neuroimaging, London). The data were then re-referenced to the average across all 64 EEG scalp 232 channels and the pairs of vertical and horizontal EOG electrodes were referenced to each other. Noisy channels 233
were interpolated using FieldTrip (Oostenveld et al., 2011) . Eyeblinks were marked using the vertical EOG and 234 the associated spatial confounds were corrected using SPM12's signal-space projection (SSP) method. The data 235
were then bandpass filtered between 0.1 and 40 Hz and epoched into -0.1 to 3 s segments around stimulus onset 236 for event-related potential (ERP) analyses. Each epoch was baseline-corrected (mean amplitude subtraction) using 237 the -0.1 to 0 s period pre-stimulus-onset. Trials with incorrect responses or response times more than 3 standard 238 deviations from the mean (within-participant, collapsed across each condition) were excluded, so that the EEG 239 data represented the typical responses for each participant. The data were then robust-averaged (i.e. the 240 contribution of each trial to the average, iteratively weighted by noise level; Wager et al., 2005) and the bandpass 241 filter and baseline correction were re-applied. Finally, in order to conduct statistical parametric mapping (Penny 242 et al., 2011) in SPM 12, we converted the robust-averaged ERPs into three-dimensional images (x and y space, ms 243 time) and smoothed them with a 12 mm x 12 mm x 12 ms FWHM Gaussian kernel to accommodate for intersubject 244 variability. 245
Analysis
246
Behavioral preprocessing
247
Within each participant's data, we first removed responses faster than 500 ms (e.g. accidentally pressing the mouse 248 button too quickly; median = 0, range = 0 to 90 trials removed per participant for Experiment 1 and median = 4, 249 range = 0 to 87 trials for Experiment 2). Accuracy on the orientation task was near ceiling in both experiments 250 (mean and standard deviation of accuracy for Experiment 1: expected neutral = 98.0% ± 1.8%, unexpected neutral 251 = 97.5% ± 2.2%, expected fearful = 96.9% ± 2.6%, unexpected fearful = 97.9% ± 2.5%; Experiment 2: expected 252 neutral = 94.5% ± 5.9%, unexpected neutral = 95.1% ± 4.0%, expected fearful = 94.2% ± 5.3%, unexpected fearful 253 = 94.9% ± 4.9%). We only entered the correct trials into our response time analysis and EEG analysis. We removed 254 responses more than five standard deviations from the mean (e.g. lapse in attention to experiment; approximately 255 M = 1, SD = 1 trials removed per participant for Experiment 1 and no outliers detected in Experiment 2) collapsed 256 across conditions. For Experiment 1, the average trial counts were 291 for expected neutral (225 to 300), 292 for 257 expected fearful (277 to 300), 58 for unexpected neutral (54 to 60), and 58 for unexpected fearful (45 to 60) faces. 258
For Experiment 2, two participants had less than 80 trials in at least one condition (due to very slow responses that 259 went into the next trial) and thus were deemed to have insufficient data for EEG analysis. After removing these 260 two participants, the average trial counts for 31 participants were 493 for expected neutral (379 to 522), 496 for 261 expected fearful (429 to 523), 99 for unexpected neutral (80 to 104), and 99 for unexpected fearful (84 to 105) 262
faces. 263
Linear mixed effects modelling 264 To investigate differences in response time between conditions, we entered the data into a hierarchical series of 265 linear mixed effects (LME) models using the "lme4" package (Bates et al., 2014 ) in R v3.4.3 (Team, 2014 . The 266 LME is an extension of linear regression that estimates both fixed and random effects (Gelman and Hill, 2006) . 267
This approach allowed us to encapsulate all data from all participants (rather than taking a mean or median 268 response time per participant) and to account for different trial numbers per experimental condition (Baayen et al., 269 2008) . LME also allowed us to model fixed and random effects of no interest to maximise statistical power (Barr 270 et al., 2013) . These included the fixed effects of participant gender and block order (i.e. whether participants were 271 assigned a neutral or fearful block first), and the random effects of participant (as the experiment was a repeated-272 measures design), trial number (indicating fatigue and/or learning effects across the duration of the experiment) 273 and anxiety (summed state/trait score from the STAI questionnaire). Summed anxiety scores (which can range 274 from 40 to 160) for Experiment 1 ranged from 46 to 107 (M = 69.97, SD = 15.90) and for Experiment 2 ranged 275 from 40 to 108 (M = 71.94, SD = 16.02). We constructed a series of 5 hierarchical models, with the first 276 encapsulating just the effects of no interest and then each subsequent model incorporating an additional effect of 277 interest (in this case, the main effects of emotion, expectation, and their interaction). To test for significant 278 differences between these models, we performed likelihood ratio tests. 279
Drift diffusion modelling
280
To better elucidate the mechanism by which expectation influences response times to neutral and fearful faces, we 281 employed drift diffusion modelling (Ratcliff, 1978) . DDM depicts binary decision-making as a stochastic process, 282 whereby evidence gradually accumulates (with added noise) from a starting point (z) towards one of two thresholds 283 (a). Several other parameters influence the resultant response, such as the drift rate (v; the rate of evidence 284 accumulation) and non-decision time (t0; the duration of stimulus encoding; Ratcliff and McKoon, 2008) . We 285 focused on the parameters for the decision threshold (a), drift rate of evidence accumulation (v), and the non-286 decision time for stimulus encoding (t0). Specifically, we were interested in how these parameters might differ 287 between emotion and expectation conditions. 288
For the parameter optimisation, rather than allowing all three parameters of interest to vary per condition (resulting 289 in 12 parameters instead of 3), we constructed a series of eight models to see which combination of condition-290 specific parameters (e.g. 4 a parameters, one per condition, with 1 v and 1 t0 parameter for all the data, versus 4 v 291 and 4 t0 parameters, one per condition, with 1 a parameter for all the data, etc.) best explained the group data (all 292 trials pooled across participants). The eight models were: 1) no condition-specific parameter optimisation, 2) a, 3) 293 v, 4) t0, 5) a and v, 6) a and t0, 7) v and t0, and 8) a, v, and t0. We pooled the data across all participants so that we 294 maximised our power, due to the relatively lower number of incorrect trials (correct responses: count = 36,802, 295 count per condition = 3,055 to 15,390, mean RT = 1.844 ± 0.423; incorrect responses: count = 801, count per 296 condition = 52 to 356, mean RT = 1.887 ± 0.501). 297
We used the fast-dm software (Voss and Voss, 2007) to optimise the parameters using maximum likelihood 298 estimation. For the estimation, we fixed four variables based on the design features of our task. First, we fixed z 299 to 0.5 because face orientation was randomised and thus participants could not be biased towards a correct or 300 incorrect orientation before the trial had begun. Second, we fixed differences in speed of response execution to 0 301 because we expected motor responses to be relatively uninfluenced by expectation or emotion. Third, we fixed 302 inter-trial variability of z and v to 0 because there were low trial numbers for the incorrect responses to reliably 303 estimate inter-trial variability. This left a, v, t0, inter-trial variability in t0 (as recommended by Voss and Voss, 304 2007) , and percentage of contaminants (i.e. guesses) as free parameters that could vary either generally or 305 condition-specifically (expected/unexpected and neutral/fearful faces), depending on the model. We then 306 compared the minimised log likelihood across all eight models, as well as the AIC (criteria for best model ≥ 3; 307 Raftery, 1995) to account for models with more parameters, to see which parameter optimisation set-up resulted 308 in the best explanation of the data. We also used the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic (p) as a measure of model 309 fit, where p > .05 indicates sufficient goodness-of-fit. We adjusted p for models with condition-specific free 310 parameters by calculating p 1-k , where k is the number of conditions (Voss and Voss, 2007) . 311
After establishing the best parameter optimisation set-up across all participants, we took the winning model 312 architecture and conducted parameter optimisation on each participant so that we could statistically compare 313 differences in condition-specific parameters using a 2 × 2 repeated-measures ANOVA (between emotion and 314 expectation). 315
EEG analysis 316
Robust-averaged ERPs 317
We conducted general linear model (GLM) analyses in SPM 12 on the robust-averaged ERPs per condition using 318 each participant's smoothed 3D images. Each GLM consisted of a 2 (expected, unexpected) × 2 (neutral, fearful) 319 repeated-measures design, where we investigated the main effects of emotion and expectation, and their 320 interaction. Each participant's gender, block order (i.e. whether the experiment began with a predominantly neutral 321 or fearful block), and anxiety (summed state and trait scores) were also entered as covariates of no interest and 322 mean-centred. We compared four variations on this GLM, each of which incoporated the behavioral data to explain 323 the observed ERP data in a distinct way. The first GLM consisted of the above design without any additional 324 components. The second GLM included participant's average response time per condition as a covariate of interest. 325
The third and fourth GLMs were 'model-based' GLMs (O'doherty et al., 2007) , such that they included covariates 326 for either the v or t0 parameter estimates per condition derived from DDM per condition. For each of these GLMs, 327 the resultant SPMs were corrected for multiple comparisons according to Random Field Theory (Worsley, 2006) . 328
Given the large number of multiple comparisons in this particular experimental design (due to the long epoch 329 duration of 3 seconds -3,072 samples), we applied a small volume correction so that we only examined results 330 across the scalp from 0 to 2 seconds as we were primarily interested in neural activity preceding response time 331
(average response times = 1.844 s, SD = 0.423 s). Only clusters with p < .05 family-wise-error (FWE) corrected 332 were considered. 333
Source reconstruction 334
For cortical source reconstruction from our EEG data, we used the Multiple Sparse Priors (MSP) method (Friston 335 et al., 2008) implemented in SPM12. This method is a Bayesian solution to the EEG inverse problem that puts 336 certain constraints (i.e. priors) on likely sources of observed EEG activity, including that the sources are likely 337 multiple and sparse. First, a head model was constructed for each participant's EEG data using a canonical T1 338 image provided by SPM12 and estimated using a single-sphere Boundary Element Model (Mattout et al., 2007) . 339
We then optimised the inversion process by simultaneously inverting the data for each condition across all 31 340 participants (i.e. group inversion), thus assuming that the responses in all participants (who each completed the 341 same experimental task) should be explained by the same set of sources (Litvak and Friston, 2008) . After group 342 inversion, we then extracted cortically-smoothed images over space (8 × 8 × 8 mm FWHM Gaussian kernel) of 343 the estimated source activity per condition across several time windows of interest. The first window was 0 to 2 344 seconds (similar to the ERP analysis described above). The second, third, and fourth were 500 ms bins from 0.5 345 to 1 s, 1 to 1.5 s, and 1.5 to 2 s, allowing us to observe how source activity changed over time. 346
Our first statistical analysis was a 2 (emotion) × 2 (expectation) full factorial GLM, where the levels of each factor 347 were dependent and the variance was assumed to be unequal. We entered in gender, block order, and anxiety as 348 mean-centred covariates of no interest and then examined the main effects and interactions (F tests). If significant, 349 these were followed up with t-tests to examine the specific direction of each effect. We then conducted separate 350
GLMs to examine how cortical sources evolved over time as a function of two key DDM parameters: drift rate (v) 351 and non-decision time (t0), which were found to vary in the winning model from the DDM group optimisation 352 stage described earlier. Hence, there were six separate GLMs (2 parameters (v and t0) × 3 time windows -500 ms 353 each). The design of each was the same as the first (i.e. 2 × 2 full factorial with 3 covariates of no interest) but had 354 an additional DDM covariate of interest (either v or t0 value per condition, per participant). To follow up the 355 behavioural results we observed earlier, we computed specific t contrasts. Specifically, for drift rate (v), we found 356 behavioural evidence that v is interactively influenced by emotion and expectation, and so we tested if the v 357 parameter covaried with interactive effects at the source level (that is, greater activity for unexpected than expected 358 fearful faces, compared with neutral faces). Similarly, we found behavioural evidence that non-decision time (t0) 359 was influenced by expectation, and so we tested if the t0 parameter covaried with stronger (contrast 1) or weaker 360 (contrast 2) source activity for surprise. For all GLMs, the SPM Anatomy Toolbox was used to identify the 361 significant sources (Eickhoff et al., 2005) , p < .05 cluster-level family-wise-error-corrected. 362
RESULTS
363
Prior expectations speed up breakthrough of neutral but not fearful faces 364 Experiment 1 was our first investigation into how emotion and expectation might interactively influence 365 breakthrough times in a bCFS paradigm. Using LME to model all trial data (accounting for inter-participant 366 variance, gender, block order, trial number, and anxiety score; see Fig. 2C ), we discovered that the interaction 367 model (response time ~ emotion × expectation + gender + block order + random effect of subject + random effect 368 of anxiety + random effect of trial number) was the highest performing (χ 2 = 9.282, p = .002; see 
387
We conducted Experiment 2 on 31 new participants to investigate whether patterns of neural activity unfolded 388 differently over time between emotion and expectation conditions during interocular suppression. We modified 389 the paradigm from Experiment 1 to accommodate the EEG recording (see Methods for details). We replicated the 390 main behavioural results from Experiment 1 using this modified version of the task on a new group of participants. 391
The interaction model was, again, the highest performing model relative to all others (χ 2 = 15.075, p = 1.034 × 10 Overall, the behavioural results from Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrate that implicitly-learned expectations for 398 emotional expression accelerated reponses to neutral faces, while there was either no effect (Experiment 1) or the 399 opposite effect (Experiment 2) on fearful faces. Hence, these results favour the Survival Hypothesis, such that both 400 expected and unexpected fearful stimuli were prioritised for conscious access. This is in contrast with the Additive 401 Hypothesis (that there would be an equal influence of prior expectations on neutral and fearful faces) and the 402 Emotional Exaggeration Hypothesis (that there would be an even larger effect of expectation on fearful than neutral 403 faces). 404
Prior expectations shorten non-decision time and unexpected threat accelerates evidence 405 accumulation
406
We used drift diffusion modelling to explain the response time patterns (i.e. faster for expected than unexpected 407 neutral faces, while the opposite was true for fearful faces). We conducted this analysis on the behavioural data 408 from Experiment 2, rather than Experiment 1, because Experiment 2 contained considerably more trials and also 409 allowed us to relatethe resultant decision parameters to the EEG data. In an initial group-level parameter 410 optimisation step (see Methods for details), we established that the data overall were best explained when the drift 411 rate (v) and non-decision time (t0) were free to vary per condition (giving four condition-dependent values for each 412 parameter), while the threshold (a) parameter was free to vary across all the data generally -this was model 7 (v, 413 t0; see to all other conditions. 435
Overall, the DDM results illustrate that the differential effect of prior expectations on response times to neutral 436 and fearful faces may be explained by a combination of non-decision time and drift rate in the decision-making 437 process. Non-decision time, representing stimulus encoding and/or motor response time, is hastened by prior 438 expectations, explaining the faster response times to expected than unexpected neutral faces. For fearful faces, on 439 the other hand, evidence accumulation is accelerated specifically for unexpected fearful faces; hence, the faster 440 response times to unexpected than expected fearful faces. The DDM analysis explained the pattern of the response time via modulation of non-decision time and drift rate, 454 such that response times to expected faces are accelerated (faster sensory encoding and/or motor execution) but 455 response times to fearful faces are even faster when they are unexpected (more rapid evidence accumulation). We 456 investigated this further by examining the timing of neural correlates with emotion and expectation processing. 457
We conducted a General Linear Model in SPM to determine when and where in the scalp activity there was 1) a 458 main effect of emotion (neutral vs. fearful), 2) a main effect of expectation, and 3) an interaction between emotion 459 and expectation. This was achieved by conducting a full factorial ANOVA, with gender and block order added as 460 covariates of no interest. After restricting the time window to 0 to 2 seconds post-stimulus onset (since we were 461 interested in the activity preceding response times) and correcting for multiple comparisons (p < .05, cluster-level 462 FWE), we did not observe significant differences in amplitude between expected and unexpected faces across the 463 scalp. This was the case for both neutral and fearful faces, as there was no significant interaction effect. There 464 were, however, three significant clusters for fearful versus neutral face activation (not shown). Both clusters 465 spanned left occipital-parietal electrodes, where fearful faces elicited greater negative activity from 1.353 to 1.439 466 seconds and then from 1.661 to 1.768 seconds. 467
In conjunction with our scalp analysis, we also estimated the neural sources underlying the scalp activity from 0 468 to 2 seconds post-stimulus onset. We first looked at emotion and expectation effects and found significant main 469 effects of each, as well as an interaction (see Fig. 4 ). There was significantly (p < .05, clusters FWE-corrected) 470 greater activity for neutral than fearful faces in left V3/V4 and for fearful than neutral faces in the right middle 471 temporal gyrus, in line with previous fMRI research (Sabatinelli et al., 2011) . For expected faces, there was 472 significantly greater activity in the left and right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), left V3/V4, right middle frontal gyrus, 473 and right temporal pole, supporting previous fMRI studies on expectation across sensory modalities (Hedge et al., 474 2015 , Osnes et al., 2012 . In contrast, there was significantly greater activity for unexpected faces in left V1/V2, 475 consistent with previous fMRI work Koechlin, 2008, Kok et al., 2012) . Finally, the emotion by 476 expectation interaction consisted of a greater surprise effect (that is, greater activity for unexpected than expected) 477 for fearful than neutral faces in the right IFG and the left superior temporal gyrus (STG). In contrast, there was a 478 greater surprise effect for neutral faces in the right middle temporal gyrus (MTG) and STG. These findings are 479 consistent with previous fMRI studies demonstrating a role for the IFG in anticipating negative stimuli (Ueda et 480 al., 2003 , Sharot et al., 2011 . Overall, our scalp and source analyses revealed a network of occipital, temporal, 481 and frontal areas associated with emotion and expectation. 482 Higher drift rate for fearful surprise covaries with greater activity in the right IFG and faster non-decision time covaries with greater activity in visual areas
We then turned towards a model-based approach to EEG analysis to further elucidate how decision-making mechanisms relate to neural activity. This modeling analysis on response time revealed that drift rate was accelerated for fearful surprise and also that there was faster non-decision time for expected than unexpected faces.
To find the neural correlates of these effects, we first conducted a scalp-level GLM similar to the one described above except that we also included non-decision time as a covariate of interest. We specifically investigated when and where non-decision time covaried with surprise-related neural activity (i.e. expected vs. unexpected). This revealed a cluster of central occipital activity from 1.106 to 1.188 seconds(not shown).
At the source level, we examined activity across three time windows (0.5 to 1 second, 1 to 1.5 seconds, and 1.5 to 2 seconds) to see whether there might be dynamic changes in significant sources over time. During only the 0.5 to 1 second window, we found that there was significantly greater activity for surprise in left V1/V2 for people who had faster non-decision time (p < .05, clusters FWE-corrected; see Fig. 5 ). Altogether, these results suggest that shorter non-decision time for expected than unexpected trials likely reflects faster stimulus encoding (Ratcliff and McKoon, 2008) , supporting previous studies finding early spatiotemporal correlates (Nunez et al., 2017) and greater activity for surprise in the primary visual cortex Koechlin, 2008, Kok et al., 2012) .
For the log-transformed drift rate parameter (v), we found that there was greater activity in the right IFG for fearful than neutral surprise when drift rate parameters were higher (see Fig. 5 ). This was the case for time windows spanning 1 to 2 seconds. There was also a borderline-significant cluster in the left inferior parietal lobule (p = .067) within the 1 to 1.5 second time window. Hence, the right IFG appears to be associated with accelerated evidence accumulation to surprising threats emerging into conscious perception. Note that we did not observe any significant clusters of activity at the scalp level after correcting for multiple comparisons (p < .05 cluster-level FWE) for the correlation between drift rate and the emotion × expectation interaction (that is, a greater effect of surprise for fearful than neutral faces).
Overall, this model-based neuroimaging analysis revealed the evolution of source activity over time for each of our key DDM parameters and how these covaried with emotion-induced and expectation-induced neural activity.
Particularly, we found an initial, short-lived increase in primary visual cortex activity for surprise when nondecision time was faster. Finally, there was a consistently greater effect of fearful than neutral surprise when drift rate was higher in the right IFG from 1 to 2 seconds, suggesting a potential role for this area in facilitating earlier conscious perception of unexpected threats. 
DISCUSSION
Here we set out to explore the interaction between emotion and expectation on the conscious awareness of stimuli, and to determine the neural mechanisms underlying these effects. To achieve this, we modelled behavioural responses to neutral and fearful faces that emerged from continuous flash suppression (CFS) and were either expected or unexpected, and correlated the resulting parameters to human neural activity recorded with EEG. In line with previous research, we found that expectation accelerated the conscious perception of faces. Model-based EEG analyses revealed that this was driven by faster non-decision time for expected than unexpected faces, which correlated with increased activation of early visual cortex shortly after stimulus onset. Fearful faces were fastest to be consciously perceived overall but, crucially, were either unaffected by expectation (Experiment 1) or were faster to break through into consciousness when unexpected (Experiment 2). We discovered that this was driven by an especially fast rate of evidence accumulation (drift rate) for surprising fearful faces, which correlated with sustained activity in the right IFG. These results are consistent with the Survival Hypothesis, and suggest that occipital and frontal networks in the human brain facilitate the fast detection of danger, even when such threats are improbable and tangential to the task at hand.
Our results provide experimental evidence for the folk notion that 'we see what we want to see'. Fearful faces, which present an evolutionarily-relevant ambiguous threat signal, were more quickly detected than neutral faces, in line with previous research (Hedger et al., 2014 , Capitão et al., 2014 , Yang et al., 2007 , Tsuchiya et al., 2009 ).
Our analysis also revealed that fearful faces evoked stronger activity in the right MTG and accelerated the rate of evidence accumulation (drift rate), the latter of which supports previous research showing that emotional content increases drift rate in perceptual decision-making (Tipples, 2015) even if unconsciously-presented via CFS (Lufityanto et al., 2016) .
Our results also support the folk notion that 'we see what we expect to see'. Consistent with previous literature (Pinto et al., 2015 , Hesselmann et al., 2010 , Vetter et al., 2014 , Hohwy et al., 2008 , expected stimuli were detected faster than unexpected stimuli. Drift-diffusion modelling of reaction time data revealed that this effect was underpinned by a reduction in non-decision time with expectation (for both neutral and fearful faces), a finding that is consistent with previous research on temporal expectations (Jepma et al., 2012) . Subsequent model-based EEG analyses revealed that this effect correlated with greater activity in left V1/V2 for surprise in only the earliest analysed time window (0.5 to 1 second post-stimulus onset), complementing a previous DDM-based EEG study on attention that found early (150-275ms post-stimulus onset) activity related to non-decision time (Nunez et al., 2017) . Together, the early timing and location of these effects suggest that expectation accelerates stimulus encoding rather than motor execution, the correlates of which would likely occur in motor areas and much closer to the participants' response (average response time ~1.8 seconds). Consistent with this interpretation, recent studies have suggested that expectation 'sharpens' sensory representations in the primary visual cortex , or, alternatively, neural scaling (Alink et al., 2018) , either of which could account for the reduced neural activity in response to expected faces that we observed here.
We discovered that expectation and emotion interacted to influence conscious perception, such that expectation hastened the detection of neutral but not fearful faces. Drift-diffusion modelling of reaction time data from Experiment 2 revealed that this interaction was driven by a faster rate of evidence accumulation (drift rate) for unexpected fearful faces, relative to all other conditions. This interaction effect could explain why previous studies using only neutral stimuli have found no influence of expectation on drift rate (De Loof et al., 2016) . Similar effects on drift rate have previously been seen with attention (Tavares et al., 2017 , Nunez et al., 2017 , and previous work on inattentional blindness has suggested that unexpected threatening stimuli (e.g. spiders, guns or snakes: New and German, 2015 , Wiemer et al., 2013 , Gao and Jia, 2017 ) draw more attention and thus are more likely to be noticed than unexpected neutral stimuli (but see also (Calvillo and Hawkins, 2016, Beanland et al., 2017) . In accordance with this literature, we speculate that the enhanced drift rate to unexpected fearful faces and their subsequent early conscious perception might reflect an underlying interaction between (exogenous) attention and prediction. Consistent with this interpretation, a recent discussion of predictive coding theory suggests that attention interacts with prediction to optimise the expected precision of predictions via gain-modulation of prediction errors (Feldman and Friston, 2010) , and a recent study conducted by our group provided experimental evidence for this theory (Smout, Tang, Garrido & Mattingley, 2019) . Since prediction errors (in predictive coding) and drift rate (in sequential sampling) can be considered to be equivalent (under certain simplifying assumptions, see Bitzer et al., 2014) , it follows from this theory that attended and unexpected stimuli should exhibit increased drift rate (or, equivalently, prediction errors), as we observed here.
Our source analysis revealed that the right IFG showed persistently greater signal for fearful than neutral surprise when drift rate was higher. This is consistent with findings for the involvement of the IFG in generating the mismatch negativity ERP response to unexpected stimuli (Garrido et al., 2009 , Doeller et al., 2003 , Opitz et al., 2002 , Kim, 2014 . Critically, our results further extend this finding by demonstrating that this effect is enhanced for threatening stimuli and is associated with accelerated evidence accumulation even while stimuli are breaking through into conscious perception. Hence, the right IFG may play a significant role in increasing the gain of prediction error signals for fearful faces. Indeed, previous research has found the IFG to respond more to fearful than neutral faces (Ishai et al., 2004 , Luo et al., 2007 , with IFG activity being predictive of fearful face perception near the threshold of conscious awareness (Pessoa and Padmala, 2005) . Our time-resolved source-level GLM results suggest that unexpected threat triggers rapid evidence accumulation for dichoptically-suppressed face stimuli, involving the right IFG as early as 1 second (see Fig. 5 ) before a conscious perceptual decision is made.
Future research could broaden the extent of this network by using MEG or fMRI to tap into both subcortical and cortical sources to see whether circuits including the amygdala (Tamietto and De Gelder, 2010, Mitchell and Greening, 2012) may contribute to unexpected threat responses in the IFG.
Overall, our results present a newly-discovered interaction between prior expectations and emotional expression that modulates how early we can make conscious perceptual decisions about faces. This effect was driven by an acceleration of early stimulus encoding by prior expectations, as well as an early and sustained increase in evidence accumulation, involving the right IFG, specifically for unexpected fearful faces. Although we took a measure of non-clinical state and trait anxiety that did not significantly correlate with behavioural or neural responses in our healthy participants, it is conceivable that the conscious perception of threat might be modulated by prior expectations in clinical anxiety, which is characterised by threat overexpectancy (Aue and Okon-Singer, 2015) . It has also recently been shown that people with schizophrenia have aberrant expectations for threat (Dzafic et al., 2018 , Barbalat et al., 2012 . Hence, future computational psychiatric research may yield invaluable findings by exploring this line of research in people with various types of clinical anxiety (e.g. social anxiety, specific phobia, or post-traumatic stress disorder) or schizophrenia.
